Abstract-We present a stateless defense against the Neighhor Discovery Denial-of-Service (ND-DOS) attack in IPv6. The ND-DOS attack consists of remotely flooding a target suhnet with hogus packets destined for random interface identifiers; a different one for each malicious packet. The 128-bit IPv6 address reserves its 64 low-order hits for the interface ID. Consequently, the malicious packeh are very likely to fall on previously unresolved addresses and the target access router (or leaf router) is obligated to resolve these addresses by sending neighbor solicitation packets.
Abstract-We present a stateless defense against the Neighhor Discovery Denial-of-Service (ND-DOS) attack in IPv6. The ND-DOS attack consists of remotely flooding a target suhnet with hogus packets destined for random interface identifiers; a different one for each malicious packet. The 128-bit IPv6 address reserves its 64 low-order hits for the interface ID. Consequently, the malicious packeh are very likely to fall on previously unresolved addresses and the target access router (or leaf router) is obligated to resolve these addresses by sending neighbor solicitation packets.
Neighbor solicitation packets are link layer multicast (or broadcast), and hence also forwarded by bridges. As a consequence, the attack may consume , . important bandwidth in subnets with wireless bridges, or access points. This problem is particularly important in the presence of mobile IPv6 devices that expect incoming sessions from the Internet. In this case, address resolution is crucial for the access router to reliably deliver incoming sessions to idle mobile devices with unknown MAC addresses.
We propose a novel neighbor solicitation technique using Bloom filters. Multiple IPv6 addresses-(bogus or real) that are waiting in the access router's addmss resoIution queue are compactly represented using a Bloom filter. By broadcasting a single neighbor solicitation message that carries the Bloom filter, multiple IPv6 addresses are concurrently solicited. Legitimate neighbor solicitation triggering packets ace not denied service. An on-link host can detect its address in the received Bloom filter and return its MAC address to the access router.
A bandwidth gain around 40 can be achieved in aU cells of the hrget subnet. This approach that we'call Compact Neighbor Discovery (CND) is the first bandwidth DOS defense that we are aware of to employ a bandwidth optimization.
I. INTRODIJCTION
DENIAL-OF-SERVICE attacks that consume network resources continue to threaten the Internet. The freedom offered by the best effort and connectionless IP routing service is unfortunately exploited for DOS (Denial-of-Service) attacks that flood victim sites with bogus packets and consume the network resources. During the last decade, the Internet community had to fight against these attacks through research, standardization, emergency response and training. Nevertheless, attackers constantly search for new vulnerabilities for mounting new attacks and making as many victims as possible. Attackers have demonstrated deep knowledge about IP functions and their design rational. Any vulnerability is exploited. In an evolving Internet, DOS defense therefore requires thorough risk assessment. The potential threats that may emerge in the future must be identified and countermeasures must be developed where possible and before a threat becomes reality. Neighbor Discovery (ND) [ l ] protocol; the successor of ARP [21 in IPv4. The IETF SEND (SEcure Neighbor Discovery) working group analyzed the potential security flaws of ND and published the assessed risks in [3]. Most of them were on-link threats. i.e. exploitable by on-link attackers located in the same subnet as the victim(s). A notable example is the neighbor advertisement/solicitation spoofing attack. In ND, nodes on the same link use neighbor soEicitarion and neighbor adverrisement messages to create bindings between IP addresses and MAC addresses. These entries are held in a data structure called neighbor cache. The neighbor advertisement spoofing attack consists of impersonating a victim node and modifying its neighbor cache entry held by other nodes. This attack causes packets for the victim, both hosts and routers, to be sent to some other link layer address. In its simplest form this attack makes the victim unreachable.
The SEND working group addressed these on-link threats using cryptographic techniques e.g. authentication. authorization and proof of address ownership [4], IS]. One particular flaw, however, was a flooding-based DOS attack mountable by arty Internet node. This threat fell out of the working group's principal scope. The subject flooding threat is referred to as the Neighbor Discovely DOS attack and is ai the focus of this
Papa-
The ND-DOS attack consists of flooding a target subnet with bogus packets destined for random interface identifiers; a different one for each malicious packet. The 128-bit IPv6 address reserves its 64 low-order bits for the interface D. Consequently, the malicious packets are very likely to fall on previously unresolved addresses and the target access router (or leaf router) is obligated to resolve these addresses by sending neighbor solicitation packets. Z64 is a huge number.
For any reasonable subnet size, the number of neighbor cache entries in access router memory will have no practical significance in front of ND-DOS. In theory, for example 5,000 neighbor solicitations per second can be remotely triggered during more than 1 million centuries (i.e. 5,aoo seconds) and without reusing a given interface ID.
One of the resources being attacked is the conceptual neighbor cache, which will be filled with attempts to resolve IPv6 addresses having a valid prefix but invalid interface ID.
The SEND working group concluded that this impact can 
Bandwidth coSi of ND-DOS
In this paper we are rather focused on the bandwidth cost of the ND-DOS attack. In response to each malicious packet, the target access router is forced to link Iayer multicast a neighbor solicitation. This consumes bandwidth in the whole network since link layer multicast packets are also forwarded by bridges.
We recognize that the attack is unlikely to saturate a high speed target LAN operating at 100Mbps. if the ND-DOS packets must traverse a congested core Internel. or lower speed Internet links. However. wireless MAC protocols that operate at lower speeds may significantly suffer from it. An attacking node may saturate the wireless edges of the Internet using ND-DOS packets that are easily routed by the high speed core Internet routers. Basic 802.11 offers 1 or 2 Mbps transmission in the 2.4 GHz band using either frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) or direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). 802.11 b, an extension to 802.1 1, provides 11 Mbps transmission with a fallback to 5.5, 2 and 1 Mhps in the 2.4GHz band. 802.1 l b uses only DSSS. In theory 802.11a provides up to 54 Mbps in the 5GHz band by using an orthogonal frequency division multiplexing encoding scheme rather than FHSS or DSSS. However, it has a smaller transmission range than 802.11b. New wireless MAC protocols are also being standardized. 802.20 will support peak data rates per user around 1 Mbps in the 3GHz band. Another MAC-layer technology 802,16 is intended to support individual channel data rates of from 2Mbps io 155Mbps, but aimed at much lower speed user mobility models than 802.20.
Wiretess technology will probably evolve and transmission speeds will increase in the future. However, the core Internet will probably profit from new technologies as well. Consequently, the gap between wireless transmission speeds and DOS flooding rates may persist. It is therefore necessary to counter the ND-DOS threat through protocol design.
WireIess MAC protocols atUact our interest also because mobile IP devices will expect incoming real-time sessions from the Internet [6] . In this case, neighbor discovery upon incoming packet is crucial for reliable incoming session delivery to idle mobile devices with unknown MAC address.
C. A srateful defense (previous work)
A possible defense may consists of replacing address resolution by a stareful mechanism. This is briefly mentioned in This approach that we call Compact Neighbor Discovery (CND) is the first bandwidth DOS defense that we are aware of to employ a bandwidth optimization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section I1 describes the details of Bloom filters and Compact Neighbor Discovery, Section 111 provides an analysis, Section IV provides experimentation results, Section V presents discussions and finally Section VI concludes the paper.
COMPACT NEIGHBOR DISCOVERY

A. Neighbor discovery terminology
In IPv6, nodes on the same link use Lhe Neig?ibor Discovery (NO) protocol to discover each other's presence, to determine other nodes' link layer addresses, find routers and to maintain reachability information about paths to active neighbors [ll. IPv6 neighbor discovery is defined as part of ICMPv6 [SI.
In ND, nodes on the same link use neighbor solicilation and neighbor advertisement messages to create bindings between IP addresses and MAC addresses (i.e. for resolving IP addresses). These entries are held in a data structure called neighbor cache.
A neighbor cache entry may be in various states. For the purposes of these paper. we are mostly interested in The false positive probability and the optimal number of hash functions that minimizes it are well-known:
After inserting n elements to a bit vector of m bits, the probability that a particulaf bit is still 0 is (1 -l/m)"'". The probability of false positive in this situation is and minimized for in which case it becomes
Throughout the paper we will frequently refer to Eq.2. I.e. in this paper the optimal number of hash functions (that minimizes the false positive probabihty) is always used for any E ratio. The maximum number of hosts that can be concurrently solicited as
D. Mrrriiniitn bandwidth gain
From performance evaluation standpoint we are also interested in the maximum bandwidth gain (or, bandwidth protection) that can be obtained under energy constraints. By replacing n by nmaz in Eq. 5, we obtain the maximum bandwidth gain of CND as a function of m and Fallowable The maximum bandwidth gain formulalion assumes that the necessary number of addresses nmaz are always available in the address resolution queue. During a ND-DOS attack this condition is automatically met since neighbor solicitation triggering packets arrive at a very high rate. The number of queued IPv6 addresses quickly reach nmax. without introducing important CND delay to legitimate packets. Figure 4 shows the nmas and the corresponding G, , , This issue has also bearings on the hash computation cost paid by the access router. When under ND-DOS attack, the access router computes kopt x J hashes per second; kopt hash functions are applied to the destination IPv6 address of each ND-DOS packet, From Eq. 1 and Eq. 2, it is easily shown that
(7)
It can be noted that an unnecessarily small Pa~altowoble will increase kept. Modern hash functions run at very high speeds, and in our case the hash input is a 128-bit IPv6 address which is relatively small. However, there is no point in unnecessarily increasing the hash computation cost for an exaggerated constraint on Pal lows bi e. 10-3 10-4 10-5 IO-" 
E. Estimated bandwidth consumption
The estimated ND-DOS damages with and without CND are shown in Table II rate that results in J = 10,000. Better protection is obtained using larger Bloom filters. On the other hand, we note that increasing the Bloom filter size from 1024 to 2048 bits will have no significant benefit for 802.1 l b (the difference is about 30Kbps when J = 10,000). The Bloom filter size becomes less important beyond a certain point, which can also be observed in Figure 4 -b.
In the following section we show by experiments that large Bloom filters are rather useful for saving CPU cycles in access points with limited CPU.
ZV. EXPERIMENTS
In the previous analysis we assumed that wireless access points can keep pace with the transmission speed of their MAC protocol. Consequently. we concluded that very large Bloom filters have no significant benefit (as observed in Figure 4-b. ). This result changes however when the bottleneck is the access point CPU rather than wireless bandwidth.
We built a testbed in order to measure the neighbor soliciration ~liroughpput of a commodity 802.1 l b wireless access point.
By "neighbor solicitation throughput", we mean the number of addresses per second that can be solicited through an 802.1 Ib access point. We denote it T (addresses per second). The testbed consists of 2 machines and a 802.11b access point. An access router emulator (under ND-DOS attack) generates broadcast neighbor solicitation packets at a high rate. These packets are forwarded by the access point, and counted by a 802.11b terminal. We measure the number of neighbor solicitation packets that the access point can forward per second, and denote it 2.
We observed that the access point can forward ai most 2 N 1,500 standard neighbor solicitation packets per second, which corresponds to 1,500 x 736 = 1,lMbps. Our access point's CPU cannot keep pace with 802.1 l b bandwidth and less ND-DOS resistant than in theory. Note that a standard neighbor solicitation message can solicit one IPv6 address, and hence using standard ND we have T = 2, i.e. in OUT case T = 1,500 addresses per second can be solicited using standard ND.
Next we measured 2 with CND which however defines larger neighbor solicitation packets. due to its Bloom filter overhead. We observed that the access point can forward a smaller number of CND neighbor solicitation packets per second. However, each CND neighbor solicitation packet solicits many addresses. The results are shown in Table 111 neighbor solicitation triggering packets per second. The total number of instructions and memory accesses per neighbor solicitation triggering packet will depend on the internal details of router architecture and neighbor discovery implementation. One neighbor cache lookup is probably unavoidabIe for an incoming packet-If the destination address has no neighbor cache enuy, CPU cycles will be consumed for creating a neighbor cache entry in INCOMPLETE state and soliciting the address.
Neighbor cache lookup cost during ND-DOS attack may also be reduced using Bloom filters. Similar techniques have been proposed for speeding I P lookup in Internet routers and name lookup in distributed systems [ll] , [12] . In our case, the access router can represent the IPv6 addresses that have neighbor cache entries in its subnet using one or more Bloom filters. Upon incoming packet, the access router can check the destination's Bloom filter membership. If the destination IPv6 address is known i.e. it was coded into a Bloom filter, the access router can proceed to fetch the destination MAC address from neighbor cache (otherwise neighbor solicitation will be initiated). Provided that hash computation is faster than memory access, the compact Bloom filter presentation may be preferred when the access router is under ND-DOS attack (i.e. when most of the incoming packets are destined for addresses without neighbor cache). In this optimization false positives will lead to a small rate of unnecessary neighbor cache lookup. This has no harm except the time consumed for a misleading Bloom filter query. The unnecessary neighbor cache lookup rate that is avoided under ND-DOS attack can outweigh the cost of a small positive rate. Note also that some neighbor cache enuies will expire over time. An aged Bloom filter that is overly populated with 1-6 addresses that are no longer used can be reset and reconstructed with the actual IPv6 addresses found in the neighbor cache.
When under ND-DOS attack, if the access router has difficulties in creating J neighbor cache entries per second, the INCOMPLETE state of the neighbor cache may be skipped.
In this case, upon receipt of n neighbor solicitation triggering packets. the access router will not create neighbor cache entries in IKCOMPLETE stale (nor buffer the packets) but solicit the destination IPv6 addresses using a single CND packet. If one (or more) of the solicited addresses was real. the access router will receive a neighbor advertisement from the destination host and create a neighbor cache enuy in REACHABLE state. Having resolved the destination address. the access router can route the incoming packet next time i.e. when retransmitted by the source.
Beyond a certain ND-DOS attack rate, some neighbor solicttation triggering packets will need to be randomly dropped by the access router; first because the bandwidth gain of CND is not unlimited. and also for the router's own protection. Legitimate packets will be retransmtted and may not be dropped next time. and the destination address can be resolved.
Once an address is resolved, the packets destined to it will not enter the address resolution queue. CND will reduce the rate of dropped neighbor solicitation triggering packets, making incoming sessions more Iikely to succeed. However, this optimization has a limit.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have represented a stateless defense against the Neighbor Discovery Denial-of-Service (ND-DOS) attack in IpV6. ND-DOS i s a flooding based attack that can trigger an outstanding rate of link-layer multicast (or, broadcast) packets in a target subnet. This attack is possibly the most serious bandwidth threat for future IPVS subnets with wireless access points and mobile IP devices that expect incoming sessions from the Internet.
In flooding-based DOS attacks, attacking nodes may em- We have rather proposed a bandwidth defense through bandwidth optimization; a defense that is specific to NDDoS. Thus, the offered ND-DOS protection is not dependent on ingress filtering or IP traceback which may never find world wide deployment. and which would be useless against malicious packets with topologically correct IP addresses. We have integrated a bandwidth optimization into standard neighbor discovery. The proposed optimization that we call Coinpact Neighbor Discosen (CND), is a novel neighbor solicitation technique that uses Bloom filters. Multiple IPv6 addresses (bogus or real) in the access router's address resolution queue are compactly represented using a Bloom filter. By broadcasting a single neighbor solicitation message that carries the Bloom filter, multiple IPv6 addresses are concurrently solicited. Legitimate neighbor solicitation triggering packets are not denied service, since Bloom filters support membership queries. AD on-link host can detect its address in the received Bloom filter and return its MAC address to the access router.
Bloom filters yieId a small false positive probability. Therefore in CND, the hosts in the target subnet send unnecessary neighbor advertisements at low rates in response to neighbor solicitation messages that soIicit other nodes.
In this paper we have addressed the signaling impacts of ND-DOS, which we considered most important and least Uivial. We focused our attention on the 802.1 lb model, although CND does not depend on MAC layer specifics. We have shown that a bandwidth gain around 40 can be achieved in all cells of the target subnet. This is a promising result. It shows that, with CND assistance, modern wireless MAC protocols can cope with serious ND-DOS attacks. We have shown by experiments that by reducing the number of neighbor solicitation packets, CND can also save access poinl CPU time. Hence faster MAC protocols may also profit from it, if access points (or bridges in general) have CPU limitations.
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